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Executive Registry

85- 2467/1

27 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, DI
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Contadora Treaty

Senator Durenberger, Chairman of the SSCI, rather strongly expressed the feeling that we should do something to determine the kind of verification provisions and ability to monitor them which would be necessary in order to make a Contadora Treaty meaningful. The relevant provisions would provide for the limitation on foreign advisors, restrictions on the export of revolution and insurgency in other countries, limitations on the levels of troops at arms in the country and amnesty and equal political rights for all citizens.

What are your thoughts on this?



William J. Casey

Dist:
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

CONTADORA TREATY

FROM:

NIO/LA

EXTENSION

NO.

NIC 03239-85

DATE

24 June 1985

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. VC/NIC

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25 JUN 1985

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

NIC 03239-85
24 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: Contadora Treaty

1. In response to your request for information on what the Intelligence Community has done in support of the Contadora Treaty process, particularly on verification of compliance, I would note that we have been active in two areas:

- Providing Intelligence Community judgments on Sandinista strategy towards the negotiations and likely compliance with its provisions.
- Providing Intelligence Community support to State and DoD policymakers tasked with ensuring that the Contadora Treaty contains adequate political and security provisions as well as an effective verification mechanism.

2. In regard to the first area of support, the Intelligence Community has produced a number of current items and national estimates addressing the issue of Sandinista negotiating strategy and likely compliance with the Treaty. For example, the Key Judgments of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Nicaragua: Prospects for Sandinista Consolidation commented that the Sandinistas are essentially using negotiations to buy time for consolidation, that they would likely attempt to evade compliance with a Contadora Treaty, and that it will be difficult to establish effective verification measures (see Attachment A).

3. In regard to the second area of support, several members of the Intelligence Community, including DIA and CIA, are participating in a State Department Task Force charged with monitoring the Treaty process and providing guidance on its provisions. The Task Force developed an alternative to the 7 September 1984 draft Treaty, which was subsequently passed to the Core Four countries. The State Department has regularly forwarded observations on subsequent Treaty drafts to the Core Four countries for their consideration. (See Attachment B).

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20 June 1985


MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Contadora Agreement

1. At the SSCI hearing on long range intelligence strategy Senator Durenberger raised the question of whether we had done work to determine how the Contadora agreement could be verified -- what verification provisions would be adequate, our capability to monitor them, what we need to have to improve and make that capability adequate, i.e. on-site inspection, border checks, counting rules, whatever. We did think a little and talk about this last fall during the negotiations in Mexico. 25X1

2. Consult John Helgerson and [] on this and get [] thinking. Give me a brief report on what you learn and a recommendation for a comprehensive paper or estimate on our ability to monitor a Contadora agreement and the verification provisions that the agreement should embody. The critical provisions would be those relating to military capabilities in Nicaragua, foreign advisors, the receipt of additional arms, the fulfillment of any commitment to amnesty and participation in the internal political process. 25X1



William J. Casey

ccs: DDI
Director, African and Latin American Analysis, DI
Chief, Central American Task Force, DO
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff, DI

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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4. It would be useful to point out that the Intelligence Community continues to advise the State Department, as well as members of Congress in classified briefings, that it would be extremely difficult to verify compliance with many of the Treaty provisions. This is particularly true of those provisions relating to the number of Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua and Sandinista support for regional subversives.


Robert D. Vickers, Jr.

Attachments:

- A. Excerpt from Key Judgments of NIE 83.3-85, February 1985
- B. STATE 181644, dated 14 June 1985

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S E C R E T STATE 181644

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NU, XK
SUBJECT: CONTADORA GROUP PROPOSALS ON SECURITY ISSUES

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT HAS REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED BY CONTADORA GROUP AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTADORA MEETING MAY 14-16. THESE DOCUMENTS WILL BE CONSIDERED AT THE JUNE 17-19 MEETING. THEY SET FORTH CONTADORA GROUP PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN PARTS I (SECURITY ISSUES) AND III (FINAL DISPOSITIONS) OF THE DRAFT TREATY. IN ESSENCE, THE PROPOSALS REQUIRE CESSATION OF SUPPORT TO IRREGULAR FORCES UPON SIGNATURE WHILE PROVIDING FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY ISSUES TO BE COMPLETED 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE OR, IN THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL EXERCISES (MANIOBRAS), FOR COMMITMENTS TO TAKE EFFECT 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE. PARAGRAPH 3 SUMMARIZES THE NEW PROPOSALS. ACTION ADDRESSEE POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO MEET WITH CONTADORA DELEGATION HEAD OR HIGHER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY PRIOR TO THE JUNE 17 MEETING TO MAKE THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 4. POINTS AND QUESTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 5 ARE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR DISCUSSION AT THE STAFF LEVEL.

3. SUMMARY OF CONTADORA PROPOSALS

A. SIMULTANEITY: CESSATION OF SUPPORT TO IRREGULAR FORCES IS (IMPLICITLY) REQUIRED UPON SIGNATURE. NEGOTIATION OF COMMITMENTS ON BASES, SCHOOLS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS; ARMS AND TROOP LEVELS; AND FOREIGN MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISERS ARE TO BE COMPLETED 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY. COMMITMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL EXERCISES ARE TO TAKE EFFECT 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE.

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THE REQUIREMENT FOR CESSATION ON SIGNATURE OF SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR FORCES IS ACHIEVED BY NEW LANGUAGE IN PART III. THIS STATES THAT THE PARTIES WILL FROM THE DATE OF SIGNATURE TAKE PERTINENT INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE MEASURES IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ASSURING, INsofar AS POSSIBLE, THE IMMEDIATE APPLICATION OF THE COMMITMENTS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED TO PRESERVE AND ACHIEVE THE GOALS AND AIMS OF THE TREATY. IN THE SEPTEMBER 7 DRAFT THIS PARAGRAPH OBLIGATED THE PARTIES ONLY TO REFRAIN FROM MEASURES THAT FRUSTRATE TREATY OBJECTIVES.

B. EXERCISES

NATIONAL EXERCISES: LIMITATIONS ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE UPON SIGNATURE AND APPLY TO NATIONAL EXERCISES HELD WITHIN 30 KILOMETERS OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES.

INTERNATIONAL EXERCISES: LIMITATIONS, TO BE EFFECTIVE 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE, INCLUDE 90-DAY PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO THE CVC; PROHIBITION ON EXERCISES WITHIN 50 KILOMETERS OF FRONTIERS (UNLESS NEIGHBORING STATE CONSENTS); CEILING OF ONE INTERNATIONAL EXERCISE PER YEAR OF NO MORE THAN 60 DAYS DURATION; REQUIREMENT THAT FOREIGN TROOPS NOT EXCEED HOST COUNTRY TROOPS. PROPOSAL ALSO CONTEMPLATES A CEILING ON THE COMBINED TOTAL OF FOREIGN AND HOST GOVERNMENT TROOPS BUT LEAVES THE NUMBER UNSPECIFIED. THERE IS ALSO A REQUIREMENT THAT NO EXERCISE SHALL HAVE AN "INTIMIDATING CHARACTER."

C. ARMS AND TROOP LEVELS

PROPOSAL CONTEMPLATES A 2-STAGE NEGOTIATION TO BE COMPLETED 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE.

FIRST STAGE:

-- SUSPENSION UPON SIGNATURE OF ACQUISITION OF ALL WAR MATERIAL EXCEPT FOR RESUPPLY, MUNITIONS AND SPARE PARTS

AND FOR A FREEZE ON TROOP LEVELS, BOTH TO BE EFFECTIVE WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS.

-- SUBMISSION OF INVENTORIES ON ARMS, TROOP LEVELS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 15 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE.

" COMPLETION OF CVC TECHNICAL STUDIES 60 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE.

SECOND STAGE:

- NEGOTIATIONS OF MAXIMUM LIMITS AND CALENDARS FOR ADJUSTMENT TO THOSE LIMITS ON ARMS, TROOP LEVELS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS TO BE COMPLETED 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE.

-- IN EVENT NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT RESULT IN AGREEMENT, LIMITS RECOMMENDED IN CVC TECHNICAL STUDIES ARE TO APPLY "PROVISIONALLY" WHILE CVC ASSISTS IN CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

D. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES

FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ARE ADDED TO PARAGRAPH PROVIDING FOR THE GRADUAL ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND SCHOOLS.

NEGOTIATIONS OF A CALENDAR FOR DISMANTLING OF EXISTING BASES, SCHOOLS AND INSTALLATIONS TO BE COMPLETED 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE. CALENDAR TO PROVIDE FOR ELIMINATION NO

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LATER THAN ONE YEAR AFTER SIGNATURE.

E. FOREIGN MILITARY AND SECURITY ADVISERS:

NEGOTIATION OF CALENDAR FOR GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ADVISERS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY, PARAMILITARY OR SECURITY ACTIVITIES TO BE COMPLETED 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE. CALENDAR TO PROVIDE FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF ADVISERS ENGAGED IN TRAINING AND OPERATIONS.

CVC TO PROPOSE, WITHIN 90 DAYS OF SIGNATURE, LIMITS ON ADVISERS ENGAGED IN EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE. (NOTE: SECTION ON ADVISERS IS UNCLEAR AS DRAFTED; SEE TALKING POINTS.)

F. SUPPORT TO IRREGULAR FORCES:

AFTER DISARMAMENT AND REMOVAL OF IRREGULAR FORCES FROM

FRONTIER ZONES, FORCES ARE TO BE RELOCATED "OUTSIDE ZONES OF CONFLICT" OR TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES (IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS ESTABLISHED BY GOVERNMENTS) WITH THE FINANCIAL AND LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS.

4. KEY TALKING POINTS:

-- US HAS COMPLETED A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE PROPOSALS THE CONTADORA GROUP DISTRIBUTED AT THE CONCLUSION AT THE LAST CONTADORA MEETING.

-- WE'D LIKE TO SHARE OUR IMPRESSIONS AND ASK FOR YOURS.

OUR BASIC IMPRESSION IS THAT THE CONTADORA PROPOSALS APPEAR DESIGNED TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF EMBRACING SIMULTANEITY WITHOUT ACTUALLY DOING SO.

-- NEGOTIATIONS ON OUTSTANDING SECURITY ISSUES ARE TO BE COMPLETED SIMULTANEOUSLY, 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE, AND LIMITATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL EXERCISES ARE TO BE EFFECTIVE AT THE SAME TIME.

- BUT NEW LANGUAGE IN THE FINAL DISPOSITIONS MAKES CLEAR THAT, AS OPPOSED TO SIMPLY ABSTAINING FROM MEASURES THAT FRUSTRATE TREATY OBJECTIVES, GOVERNMENTS ARE NOW OBLIGED FROM THE DATE OF SIGNATURE TO TAKE POSITIVE MEASURES TO ACHIEVE TREATY OBJECTIVES.

-- THIS NEW LANGUAGE SEEMS DIRECTED AT SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR FORCES. IF SO INTERPRETED AND IMPLEMENTED FULLY, MAJOR SOURCE OF PRESSURE ON THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE REMOVED ON SIGNATURE -- BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER SECURITY COMMITMENTS EVEN BEGIN. IF NOT IMPLEMENTED FULLY, SANDINISTAS WOULD HAVE GROUNDS MANY WOULD FIND PLAUSIBLE FOR CLAIMING OTHER SIDE IS VIOLATING TREATY COMMITMENTS.

-- SECOND MAJOR DIFFICULTY WE SEE IS THAT PARTIES WOULD BE EXPECTED TO COMPLETE -- WITHIN A 30-DAY PERIOD BEGINNING 60 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE AND ENDING 90 DAYS AFTER SIGNATURE -- NEGOTIATION OF COMMITMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR TWO YEARS.

- THIS IS UNREALISTIC. IDEA THAT CVC RECOMMENDED LIMITS WOULD APPLY PROVISIONALLY IN CASE AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED INDICATES, AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF ARMS, TROOP LEVELS AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, THAT THE CONTADORA GROUP UNDERSTANDS THIS. (IT IS ALSO UNREALISTIC TO

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EXPECT THE CVC TO COMPLETE SOUND AND TECHNICALLY
COMPETENT STUDIES WITHIN 45 DAYS.)

- WE HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT COMMITMENTS IN ALL THESE
AREAS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED PRIOR TO SIGNATURE. BUT IF
FOR REASONS OF CONTADORA NEGOTIATING HISTORY SOME
NEGOTIATIONS ARE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER SIGNATURE, WE
BELIEVE NO COMMITMENT SHOULD TAKE EFFECT UNTIL ALL
NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMPLETED AND THE TREATY IS RATIFIED.

-- NOTHING IN THE CONTADORA PROPOSALS TREATS THE CENTRAL
ISSUES OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. WE UNDERSTAND,
HOWEVER, THAT AT THE LAST MEETING NICARAGUA PROPOSED
CHANGES TO THE SEPT 7 DRAFT THAT WOULD EXCLUDE ARMED
GROUPS OR GROUPS RECEIVING EXTERNAL SUPPORT FROM DIALOGUE
AIMED AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. CENTRAL AMERICANS
MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NICARAGUANS RAISING THIS ISSUE TO
INSIST ON MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH ALL ARMED OPPOSITION
GROUPS AS KEY TO OVERALL CONTADORA PROGRESS.

5. POINTS TO RAISE AT STAFF LEVEL:

-- SECTION ON FOREIGN ADVISERS IS UNCLEAR TO US. IT
APPEARS CONTADORA IS PROPOSING THE GRADUAL ELIMINATION OF
ALL ADVISERS "SUSCEPTIBLE TO PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY,
PARAMILITARY AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES." THERE IS ALSO
PROVISION THAT THOSE ADVISERS ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AND
TRAINING WILL HAVE TO LEAVE "IMMEDIATELY AND
SIMULTANEOUSLY" ONCE A CALENDAR IS AGREED.

-- OUR FIRST QUESTION IS WHETHER ADVISERS ENGAGED IN
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING IS A SUBCATEGORY OF ADVISERS
SUSCEPTIBLE TO PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY, PARAMILITARY
AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES OR SYNONYMOUS WITH THEM. IF A
SUBCATEGORY, WHO ARE THE REMAINING ADVISERS SUSCEPTIBLE
TO PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY, PARAMILITARY AND SECURITY
ACTIVITIES?

- DO WE UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY THAT CONTADORA PROPOSAL
CONTEMPLATES PERMANENT RETENTION OF ADVISERS ENGAGED IN
EQUIPMENT INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE?

-- PROVISION FOR SUSPENDING ACQUISITION OF WAR MATERIAL
IS ALSO UNCLEAR TO US. DO WE UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY THAT
SUSPENSION OF WAR MATERIAL APPLIES ONLY WHILE
SECOND-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS? DOES THIS
MEAN ONLY FOR THE 90-DAY PERIOD FROM SIGNATURE TO THE
CONTEMPLATED CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS? WOULD
SUSPENSION REMAIN IN EFFECT IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE

UNSUCCESSFUL? DOES "ACQUISITION" OF WAR MATERIAL MEAN
"RECEIPT" OR "NEW ORDERS?"

-- WE NOTE CONTADORA RETAINS AS BASIC CRITERION FOR ARMS,
TROOP LEVELS AND MILITARY INSTALLATION NEGOTIATIONS THE
PRINCIPLE THAT "NO STATE SHALL HAVE AS POLITICAL
OBJECTIVE THE PURSUIT OF HEGEMONY ETC" INSTEAD OF
TEGUCIGALPA FORMULATION THAT NO STATE SHALL HAVE THE
CAPACITY TO EXERCISE HEGEMONY.

-- THIS CONTADORA FORMULATION IS TOTALLY SUBJECTIVE AND
UNVERIFIABLE AND THEREFORE MEANINGLESS IN PRACTICE, AS
TEGUCIGALPA DRAFTERS REALIZE.

6. PLEASE REPORT REACTIONS. SHULTZ

END OF MESSAGE

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SUBJECT: Contadora Treaty

NIC 03239-85

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Remarks

Executive Secretary

20 Jun 85

Date

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